Corbyn can’t bat away anti-Semitism charges

Is it possible to be an anti-Semite without being conscious of it? To take an active part in one of the world’s oldest and most fatal hatreds, yet to be able to say, with sincerity, that anti-Semitism is odious, not to be tolerated?

This isn’t a matter of keeping one’s prejudices so deeply buried that they are largely unknown to oneself. It is a case of being involved in discussions, movements and protests which use anti-Semitic tropes, seeing and reading these and yet not admitting to one’s own conscious mind—or conscience—what they say and what they mean.

It is this mystery which surrounds the actions and evasions of Jeremy Corbyn, leader of the British Labour Party. This is one of the older and more distinguished social democratic political creations of the past century and more, with reason for pride in its representation of working people and the poor, of championing of the rights of minorities, of pioneering the institutions of the welfare state and in remaining solidly anti-authoritarian, democratic and, since the last war, an active member of NATO and the United Nations, both of which it played a leading role in creating.

Labour's Jeremy Corbyn (Photo: Reuters)

Among its other achievements, the Labour Party was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the State of Israel even as it maintained a consistent view that the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians which that creation entailed should be addressed, both by extending rights to those Palestinians living in Israel and by supporting a two-state solution.

Traditional Jewish support for the party has declined sharply in the Corbyn era—where 30 percent of Jews supported Labour in 2010, only 13 percent of Jews said they would vote for the party in last year’s election.

Earlier this week, a sizeable demonstration organized by Jewish groups outside the British parliament protested against Corbyn’s blindness—willful or not—to anti-Semitic groups and currents in the party he leads. Margaret Hodge, a former Labour minister, said that “while Jeremy is not himself anti-Semitic, he has allowed himself to become the poster boy of anti-Semites everywhere.”

Hodge’s part-exculpation of her leader—“not himself anti-Semitic”—simply restates the question: what was he thinking? And what example is he setting—not just in the UK, but to the leftist movements and parties for which British Labour has at times been an example? And—further out and more disturbing still—how far is anti-Semitism now becoming “normalized” in the left worldwide, under the cover of “anti-imperialism” and “anti-Zionism.”

British Jews protest outside parliament against Labour's Jeremy Corbyn (Photo: AFP)

The charges against Corbyn include his support for the militant groups Hamas and Hezbollah, which advocate the destruction of Israel—a support which at first he refused to renounce, then later did. He objected, in 2012, to the removal of a mural in London depicting Jewish bankers plotting to enrich themselves over a Monopoly board placed on the backs of workers; he first said it was on grounds of free speech, then argued that he had not noticed its anti-Semitism (though it’s hard to miss).

In this past week, Corbyn has been accused of belonging to three Facebook groups which routinely post anti-Semitic messages. The excuses—sometimes contradictory—to all of these have begun to wear thin; hence the revolt of the Jewish organizations. A pattern emerges—of Corbyn, or another Labour official or member caught signaling an anti-Semitic attitude—then apologizing profusely when unable to deny the fact. As Jewish protests mounted against Corbyn this week, one more official—Christine Shawcross, head of the party’s disputes panel, who had supported an apparent Holocaust denier—resigned from the post on Thursday, regretting “the pain and hurt” caused to the Jewish community.

Corbyn, on his election as party leader in 2015, was at first seen as a no-hoper in electoral terms, far too far left, evidence of Labour’s inability to recover the élan it had under the leadership of Tony Blair. Then, amazingly, he became an unlikely asset to his party in the 2017 election, pressing the too-confident Conservatives hard, winning 40 percent of the vote. The danger is that this popular, “anti-establishment,” figure will legitimize, if not exactly anti-Semitism, then a blurring of the distinction between criticism of Israel and a general condemnation of “Zionism.”

British Jews protest outside parliament against Labour's Jeremy Corbyn (Photo: GettyImages)

The argument over anti-Semitism extends beyond Britain’s borders. Alan Johnson, one of the most thoughtful of the commentators writing on the issue today (not himself Jewish) wrote recently that left-wing anti-Semitism, the “anti-imperialism of idiots,” has in some leftist contexts metastasized into “anti-Semitic anti-Zionism… (which) bends the meaning of Israel and Zionism out of shape until both become fit receptacles for the tropes, images and ideas of classical anti-Semitism. In short, that which the demonological Jew once was, demonological Israel now is: uniquely malevolent.”

Most surveys show that anti-Semitism is on the rise worldwide. An 85-year-old Jewish woman, Mireille Knoll, who had narrowly escaped the Holocaust, was murdered in Paris this week, less than a year after the murder of another Jewish woman, Sarah Halimi, in the same area. Both murders have been classified as anti-Semitic. The prejudice grew in Italy, which likes to pride itself on its lack of it, during a recent election campaign that focused on immigration and foreigners. Even in the United States, seen by both Americans and Jews as the most accommodating of places, a report saw a sudden jump in anti-Jewish incidents in 2017.

Old demons never die. They retire to dark corners, ready to be redeployed at times of insecurity and alarm, when scapegoats are sought. Our world is not the Germany of the 1930s, but nor is it stable and confident. These demons are among the ugliest in our world. That a major politician should, by accident or design, increase their malevolence is shameful. He and his party must cease to treat the issue as a mere nuisance, something cooked up by his critics to discredit him, to be batted away with a few clichéd phrases of regret. It is far too deep and wide for that.

John Lloyd co-founded the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, where he is senior research fellow. Lloyd has written several books, including “What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics” and “Journalism in an Age of Terror”. He is also a contributing editor at the Financial Times and the founder of FT Magazine.

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The blame lies with Hamas, not Israel

Hello neighbors. You've been living in distress for many years. We know. We're not ignoring it. Most of us even feel your pain, because we want neighbors who live in welfare, prosperity, and with a better future for themselves and their children. A little over a decade ago Israel left the Gaza Strip, withdrawing from every last centimeter. It could've been a turning point. For the first time, some of the Palestinians faced the option of having full independence. For the first time in history, they could've realized all of their desires. It could've been a new beginning. But in short time, Hamas took over the strip. Hundreds of Palestinians were killed during that violent takeover. The Hamas regime's first step was to cancel all agreements with Israel, primarily the agreement on the border crossings. It was not Israel that put a blockade on the strip; Hamas imposed the blockade by canceling all of the agreements. Despite that, from then and until this very day, hundreds of supply trucks pass through the border crossings from Israel into the strip.

(Photo: EPA)

 Most Israelis have no interest in Gaza's collapse or in a humanitarian crisis there. And despite that, you're marching towards crisis. Not because of Israel; because of the Hamas regime. Hamas knows how to invest—but only in the death industry. More tunnels. More rockets. Had Hamas invested everything it spent on tunnels in building neighborhoods, schools and hospitals instead, the situation in the strip would've been much better. Hamas wouldn't be dragging you and us to more and more conflicts.

(Photo: Reuters)

And what came of the investment in rockets and tunnels? Only suffering for the residents of the strip. No, it has nothing to do with Israel. Look around, dear neighbors, look at other countries. You're not alone. Everywhere radical Islam has taken over, the result is destruction and ruin. This happens in Somalia, in Nigeria, in Syria, in Libya, in Pakistan and in Afghanistan. Is there one place in the world where radical Islam helped residents? Just one?

(Photo: AFP)

When Hamas rose to power, the international community set conditions to the continuation of aid: "The Quartet Principles." Accepting these principles would've led to the end of the blockade and to a better future. Even Arab leaders pressed Hamas to accept these terms. But Hamas leaders decided to say "No." It's time to protest against them. It's time to pressure them so you could have more water, more electricity, more food and more welfare. They're the problem, not Israel.

(Photo: Reuters)

For almost 70 years now that the Arab world keeps you as "refugees." No, it's not because of Israel. It's because this is what the leaders of the Arab world wanted. They had an opportunity to establish an Arab state in 1947, but they said "No" and led you to the Nakba. They had decades to rehabilitate the refugees, but they didn't want to. There was another opportunity to resolve the refugee problem with Clinton's peace initiative and other initiatives later on. But your leaders kept saying no.

(Photo: AP)

Allow us to remind you that you were not the only one in the world to suffer a "Nakba." Tens of millions were uprooted from their places of birth after the First and Second World Wars. Close to a million Jews were also expelled or had to flee from Arab countries. Many of them had their property taken and confiscated. They arrived in Israel as refugees. It wasn't easy for them at first, as it hasn't been easy for tens of millions others. But none of those tens of millions is a refugee anymore. Only you. Anyone with eyes knows the blame lies with your leaders. They didn't want to solve the problem, and you're paying the price. We don't want suffering. We want you to live alongside us, in peace, prosperity, welfare and independence. Let's not fight each other. Let's drop the delusions—and there are those on our side who prefer delusions as well—for a better reality. The entire world will help, if only you come with good will rather than hatred and incitement and delusions of the "right of return."

We also made many mistakes. There's a lot to fix, a lot that needs fixing. But we're also offering our hand in peace. Please accept it. Instead of another delusion and a "March of Return," which is all about provocation and violence, let's go on a shared march of peace, reconciliation and mutual recognition. You've been on the same march for 70 years now, on the old path, with the same result: More suffering, more distress. So you should try a new path, one that has hope. Please, accept our hand, which is offered in peace.

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Fruit of Israeli-Jordanian peace still on the tree

After a six-month diplomatic crisis between Israel and Jordan, a new ambassador—Amir Weissbrod—is expected to arrive in Amman soon to fully resume the embassy’s operations. This won’t make newspaper headlines. The Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement is barely addressed in Israeli public discourse. Many Israelis are unaware of its advantages and importance. On the Jordanian street, the attitude towards the peace agreement with Israel is even worse. It’s an attitude of hostility and objection to any form of a relationship with Israel. But these are peace relations which have a huge potential, and only a little of it has been realized.

Leaders at the signing of Israel-Jordan peace treaty (Photo: Zoom 77)

The peace agreement is based on its strategic importance to both sides. From the Jordanian perspective, the peace agreement with Israel is a highly important strategic anchor of stability: It has reinforced the Israeli umbrella of defense, as well as Jordan’s strategic relations with the United States. The Israeli-American umbrella of defense is crucial for Jordan in light of external threats from the east and from the north, but it also helps with internal security against the subversion of regional and local terror elements. From the Israeli perspective, the peace agreement with Jordan is one of the pillars of the strategic-political stability, alongside the peace agreement with Egypt. Jordan serves as a friendly buffer state and a strategic partner—in the past, against threats from an Iraqi-led Arab front, and in recent years, against an Iranian-led Shiite coalition and dangers from the direction of Syria. The extensive security cooperation became possible after the two governments recognized the critical need for this type of cooperation and invested all the required efforts, resources and attention for its development. The other areas—diplomatic, economic and civilian—haven’t enjoyed the same amount of attention and haven’t been perceived as equally vital, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has made it very difficult to advance collaborations in these areas. As a result, the great potential hidden in the peace agreement hasn’t been realized. In the diplomatic area, Jordan could become a closer partner of Israel in managing the relations with the Palestinians and furthering peace processes. It could be, as it has proved in the past, a good partner in running Jerusalem’s holy sites. In addition, it could serve as a partner in advancing relations with other Arab countries. In the civilian area, Israel and Jordan share a number of issues and joint challenges that require tighter cooperation. Water is of course a key issue, and the existing agreements—coupled with the Red Sea–Dead Sea Conveyance and water swaps plans—point to the existing potential. Furthermore, collaborations between the countries on issues and projects in the fields of environment, energy, tourism and infrastructure will provide the two countries with dividends that each country would be unable to achieve on its own.

The Israeli Embassy in Amman (Photo: Shalom Bar Tal)

It’s true that without considerable progress towards an Israeli-Palestinian agreement, the huge potential concealed in the relations between the countries cannot be fully realized. Nevertheless, in light of the existence of a formal peace agreement, real and invaluable progress can also be achieved in the current state of affairs between Israel and the Palestinians. The existing set of agreements between Israel and Jordan—in commerce, transportation, water, gas and other areas—serves as an infrastructure facilitating the quick advancement of plenty of collaborations, if the necessary priority is given. The economic aspect is a good example. From the Israeli perspective, the economic relations with the small Jordanian economy are of minor importance (even in light of the latest agreement to sell natural gas to Jordan), but Jordan has a very important role as a bridge for Israeli commerce with the large Gulf state markets and other Arab markets. According to studies conducted in recent years, opening up the Arab markets to Israel will create a new and powerful growth engine that would help increase the Israeli product by a quarter or a third more than expected in today’s conditions, and will make Israel part of the group of the world’s 15 richest countries. The Arab market will become Israel’s most important market alongside the European market. The existing commerce and transportation agreements between Israel and Jordan could serve as a basis for the development of a new route of commerce between the Gulf states’ large markets and the Mediterranean Sea, through Jordan and Israel. This route is already active today, through the Jordan River border crossing near Beit Shean and the Haifa Port, but the volume of freight passing through it is relatively small. Turning this route into a regional terrestrial bridge will become possible by connecting Israel Railways to the new regional railway network. This network is already in advanced construction stages in Saudi Arabia and along the Persian Gulf coasts. The plan is for Jordan to serve as the main junction of this network. Connecting the Jordanian train to Israel’s valley railroad will make it possible to complete the terrestrial bridge.

New Israeli Ambassador to Jordan Amir Weissbrod

 

Despite some major difficulties, this project is politically feasible, as it is based on an active route and on a system of existing trade and transportation agreements. Any progress in this project could help create a new climate of faith in Israeli-Jordanian peace and gradually change the Jordanian (and Israeli) public’s views.

To strengthen the positive influence of the economic cooperation, it’s important to couple these moves with ongoing PR efforts among both the Israeli and Jordanian publics, which would stress the benefits of the peace process, change the perception towards the other side and support the establishment of warm peace. The public perception changes, for their part, would help strengthen the collaborations and create other benefits. “Success stories” in the Israeli-Jordanian contexts would help strengthen the two countries’ regional standing as players with a stabilizing—economic and diplomatic—contribution to the regional system in general.

The Israel-Jordan peace agreement is a strategic asset with huge potential for both Israel and Jordan in many aspects. The reopening of the Israeli embassy in Jordan, after it was closed for half a year following the crisis between the countries, is an opportunity to look into ways to fix the missed opportunity and realize at least part of the major potential concealed in the peace agreement.

Yitzhak Gal is a financial and business advisor specializing in the Arab markets, and a researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies and at Mitvim—the Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.

This article is based on a study of Israel-Jordan relations written as part of a Mitvim Institute project, “Israel’s relations with Arab states: The unrealized potential,” which can be read here (in Hebrew).

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Emergency call-up in the war on anti-Semitism

This number needs to be read a few times in order to comprehend it—there are approximately 100 cases of anti-Semitism documented each month worldwide, expressions of racism through violence and even murder. And this is data only from the last several relatively "calm" months. During times of heightened security tension, these numbers double and even triple.

 

Last January, for example, anti-Semitic graffiti was sprayed in Britain, a memorial plaque to the Holocaust was defaced in Italy, leaflets denying the Holocaust were distributed in Sweden, five people were attacked in France, headstones were defaced in a Jewish cemetery in Germany, swastikas were sprayed on the cars of Jews in Australia and Canada, expressions of anti-Semitism have appeared in newspapers in Puerto Rico, Molotov cocktails have been thrown at a Jewish school in Tunisia and a British charity worker published a message against a Jewish person on Facebook saying, "The 1940s are calling, your shower is ready."

All this, and even more examples since January, without even mentioning the Polish law or the rise of the extreme right.

Anti-Semitic graffiti on the New York Subway (Photo: Gregory Locke)

This is already beyond simply raising concern: this is a real trend. And it raises an important question about the nature of the proper intervention by Israel in the fight against anti-Semitism—which has been led over the last several years by non-governmental organizations such as the World Zionist Federation, the Jewish Agency and many other local organizations. Right and Left, Orthodox and Reform, conservative and liberal: anti-Semitism unites Jewish organizations worldwide.

Unlike the past, Israel now truly has the ability as a state to act forcefully in the fight against anti-Semitism. Formal condemnations and diplomatic pronouncements are important, but they are not enough. We have an extensive arsenal of efficient weapons at our disposal: media, legal, social networks and even a not insignificant economic force in certain countries. The time has come to join forces, to recruit opinion-makers and people of influence throughout the world to begin the hunt for our pursuers. It's that simple.

Whether through the filing of claims that will be directed by leading attorneys against any global expressions of anti-Semitism on social networks so that the attackers will know that racism costs money and will think twice before giving it expression, in providing assistance to law enforcement in other countries so that anti-Semitic criminals can be identified and, of course, by spreading the message in the public and in the media. There are times when it is permissible to issue an emergency call-up, even for the biggest cultural stars and tell them—ou are now part of the war on anti-Semitism.

The Jewish-American actress Mayim Bialik is a perfect example of a public figure who is using her visibility in the fight against anti-Semitism. She is an activist, engaged in pro-Israel hasbara and has not shied away from being photographed with IDF soldiers or from expressing her support for them. She recently spoke at the 6th annual Global Forum for Combating anti-Semitism that was held at the International Convention Center in Jerusalem. It is possible and appropriate to engage other opinion-makers to act like her. Even with the encouragement and financial support of the Israeli government, if necessary.

Anti-Semitism cannot be taken lightly: these are lessons not only of the past, but also and particularly lessons of the present. This is a sickness that has claimed a heavy price from us and also damages Israel—economically and in the court of public opinion. The fight against anti-Semitism must be at the very top of Israel's public agenda in a more prominent way. If we're not the first to respond to each incident with the full gravity to which it is due—we can't complain about others.

The writer is the CEO of the International Convention Center (Binyanei Hauma) in Jerusalem.

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The full story behind the 'March of Return'

In an increasingly despairing sphere of loss and abandonment, some local activists opted to change the repeated Friday incidents that are passing unnoticed of young futureless Gazans crowding at the borders like a herd of ducks, waiting for their souls to be mercilessly harvested by Israeli snipers.

With few tents set up in the buffer zone to symbolize the refugees’ plight, the activists hoped to re-humanize the Palestinian suffering and give it a face and a story instead of continuing to be reduced into passive statistics with an ever-declining importance.

Palestinian protesters near Gaza border (Photo: EPA)

The first activist to initiate this movement and set up a tent, in response to Trump’s hostile position on Palestinian refugees and Jerusalem, was Muthana al-Najjar, an independent journalist from the impoverished village of Khuzaa. His initiative was almost unheard of as he and his fellow activists were keen to keep the protest unaffiliated with Hamas or any other political group until the latter jumped in and insisted to take part in the organization of “the great march of return.” Hamas assigned the protest mobilization task to its popular division “Al-'Amal al-Jamahiri,” and youth division “Al-Kutla al-Islamiya,” under Hani Miqbil and Mohammed Haniya, to crowd the largest number of protestors possible, and it has been incredibly efficient at that task despite Israeli attempts to kill the protest in the bud; whether by throwing leaflets on Gaza that strictly warns its residence from approaching the separation fence, or (allegedly) by intimidating transportation companies that if they carry protestors to the border zone their Erez permit to cross in/out of Gaza will be revoked, or by (as Hamas claims) commanding collaborators in Gaza to spread rumors and incite against the protest, or by deploying enormous military force at the borders. In Gaza, the local media and TV channels, the social media and newspapers are all filled with calls to join the protest. And Hamas activists are actively circulating and spreading such calls far and wide; whether on social media, amongst their friends, in street talks, in schools, universities, shops, or even at the mosques. People tell me that wherever they go, they’d encounter someone who’d call on them to join “the great march” that would set Gaza free. And such calls are hard to ignore when living on the edge of death pushing the boundaries for survival with nothing at the end of the tunnel but more agony. However, despite the Hamas leadership’s strict orders to its ranks to take an active part in the protest, neither Hamas leaders nor their immediate families are likely to put themselves at the risk that they’re inviting people to run at bare-chested.

IDF forces near the Gaza border (Photo: Barel Efraim)

Furthermore, although, Hamas firmly controls the march planning and mobilization from behind the scene, it remarkably nevertheless, hasn’t only been desperately keen to disassociate itself from the protest, but is even more keen to maintain the protest’s non-violent theme as it plans to deploy its security personnel in civil clothes amongst the protestors to prevent individual attempts to spoil the march with violence; even if by throwing rocks, or shouting hostile slogans. Hamas knows that a single sign of violent attitudes would instantly give an alibi for Israel to exercise its most favorite performance of portraying Gazans as “swarms of terrorists” whose march necessitates on Israel to practice its “right to defend itself.” Hamas is also keen to avoid any clashes with the Israeli army on the borders that would disperse the masses before their numbers peak; since its main tool is to display popular capacity to crowd Gazans around its promises. A card that is hoped to put Hamas strongly back on the international agenda as an unavoidable player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the first stage, the protest will take the shape of setting up huge tents near the buffer zone where people could perform different activities, from singing to dancing to carrying signs that read “implement resolution 194.” Hamas will suffice with two objectives: To reallocate international attention to Gaza’s unbearable suffering that its population can no longer endure, and to signal out to Israel and the PA that the masses are on its side, and can use them to reproduce Samson’s cliché “let it fall on me and my enemies,” if it continues to be cornered with no alternatives to survive. In this case, Israel’s use of force would be exactly what Hamas needs to solidify its message and spread the pictures of Gazan agony further around the world.

Tents the Palestinians erected on the Gaza border to house protesters (Photo: AFP)

Nonetheless, Hamas wholeheartedly knows from early experiences that even if Israel eases the blockade, expands the fishing and farming zones, or even opens up the borders for people’s movement to assuage the protestors’ anger, such measures wouldn’t last long before they’re revoked again at the earliest opportunity. In addition, Netanyahu’s government crisis makes the former scenario highly unexpected since Bibi is setting on a very thin ice that he cannot afford the criticism that would follow rewarding Gaza for its revolt. Therefore, Hamas relies on the terrifying scene of tens of thousands of Palestinians awaiting its signal to swipe Israel with an unprecedented civil rights movement, to convince the latter to put enormous pressure on Mahmoud Abbas to lift his suffocating sanctions on Gaza that made the beleaguered enclave greatly unlivable and on Egypt to ease their part of the blockade and accelerate the reconciliation process. As the time goes on, Hamas hopes to normalize the scene of approaching the borders, the one forbidden area that is considered to be Gaza’s deadliest zone, amongst the beleaguered population in order to encourage others to follow their lead. If Gaza’s suffering continues to be ignored, the march tone will be escalated accordingly between March 30 (Palestinian’s land day and Israel’s Passover) and May 15 (Israel’s independence and Palestinian’s Nakba “catastrophe” day). Until at some unexpected point, the despaired and ever-oppressed protestors will approach the fence, lift the gates and walk into Israel to as far as their feet could go, and demand to be treated as equal humans again. Nothing will deter such masses from continuing to swarm on Israel. Not even death. Muhammad Shehada is a Palestinian writer and civil society activist from the Gaza Strip.

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In next war with Hezbollah, Israel should look to 1967

In 1967, Israel did much more than act preemptively to win what would become known as the Six-Day War. It fought a war of blitzkrieg, ensuring it rushed its enemies and maximized the land it controlled, only then targeting the more powerful enemy strongholds—when they were isolated and weakened. Israel will need to fight such a war again if it wants to be viewed as the victor in its next war with Hezbollah.

Every year around springtime the chatter begins like clockwork: In the summer, experts claim, a war between Israel and Hezbollah will start anew. This year is no different, with the exception that Hezbollah’s entanglement in Syria is winding down, Iranian military assets are on Israel’s borders, and tensions, preparations and warnings are at an all-time high.

In other words, at least on paper, the timing for war is ripe. A lot has happened since the Second Lebanon War in 2006. While both parties have grown stronger and smarter, alliances have altered and the risks to both sides have grown.

If Israel wants to be viewed as the victor in its next war with Hezbollah, it will need to fight a war of blitzkrieg (Photo: Yoav Zitun)

Hezbollah today has an abundance of sophisticated weaponry from Iran, Syria, China and Russia. As is often pointed out in the media, the group has more rockets than nearly all NATO countries. It has cooperation and coordination with the (US-backed) Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) as well as the Lebanese government. It has a government in Syria that owes it its very existence and which is awash with Iranian Revolutionary Guard “advisors” that sit close to Israel’s borders. It has UAVs and missiles capable of targeting cities, ships and aircraft alike. Add to that the years of experience Hezbollah has gained in fighting US-backed forces such as the Kurds as well as terrorist groups such as ISIS, and Israel has itself one seriously formidable foe.

Understanding the propaganda value, any future conflict will see Hezbollah attempt for the first time to take control of an Israeli town or village, even if temporarily. And it very well may succeed in doing so (temporarily). If it is able to choose the start of the war, it will send tens of thousands of both precise and crude rockets into the Jewish state in the first few days, striking at all major Israeli population centers.

It will also attempt to target strategic Israeli positions such as Ben-Gurion Airport (and Israeli-bound aircraft), oil and gas platforms on land and sea, power and water plants, the IDF’s military headquarters in the heart of Tel Aviv, chemical plants in Haifa, and Israel’s main nuclear site in Dimona—not to mention Israeli and Jewish locations abroad. It will also make use of tunnels, with which Hezbollah has decades of experience. Nearly all of Israel will be at risk. These actions, however, will have consequences.

IDF tanks during Six-Day War (Photo: Bamahane, courtesy of IDF Archive at the Defense Ministry)

In any future conflict, Israel will attempt to target Lebanese infrastructure and punish that state for supporting Hezbollah and allowing itself to be used as cover by Hezbollah and Iran. This will result in government, military, commercial and military infrastructure being destroyed on a scale not seen in Lebanon in quite some time (if ever).

The approximately 200 villages that intentionally double as Hezbollah’s military bases in South Lebanon will be heavily damaged. Parts of Syria will likely be targeted as well, potentially bringing Assad’s remaining Syrian forces into the fray, as Hezbollah and Iran have significant resources capable of targeting Israel in that country.

Israel will begin any new conflict with the open support of the Trump administration as well as the tacit support of most of the Sunni Arab world, who are eager to see the Iranian-backed Shi'ite crescent weaken and bleed. But it will also have its share of detractors. The United States is more politicized than ever before, which means more will come out against Israel precisely as a result of US President Donald Trump’s support for the Jewish state.

Knee-jerk critics of Israel in Europe and elsewhere can be counted on to undoubtedly condemn the Jewish State regardless of the validity of its fight. Hezbollah is banking on the international community (and media) to jump into the anti-Israel frenzy, willingly and intentionally sacrificing the Lebanese civilian population to do so.

Considering its enemy and their tactics, for Israel to be viewed as the victor—especially by its own domestic population—it will need to do more than it has in previous engagements both in Lebanon and Gaza. It will need not just military success, but the conquering of large swaths of Lebanese territory to create the perception of a clear psychological and strategic victory as well.

Unlike the Second Lebanon War, this means Israel must go as far north as possible while ensuring it can control the supply lines to sustain it. The IDF need not get bogged down trying to take the individual southern Lebanese villages rife with entrenched and prepared Hezbollah resistance. It must follow the blitzkrieg strategy that it employed so successfully in 1967.

  

Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah

Preemption is also key to success, and something not easy for any democratic state to employ. Israel will need to create a casus belli to commence a war; something that should not be difficult to find. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been traditionally weary of war, but his current political troubles make him perhaps more amenable to fighting an inevitable conflict on Israel’s best terms.

Only preemption will ensure the Jewish state better controls the pace of the war from its onset, while also allowing its air force to destroy more precision guided and heavier munition rockets and missiles before they have a chance to launch. Thanks to the newest Trump administration shake up, between John Bolton and Michael Pompeo, Israel has perhaps its best allies in place for just such a strike.

Israel must also avoid creating unrealistic goals it cannot possibly guarantee, which only feeds into the narrative of its enemies. Claims to destroy Hezbollah “once and for all” sound great, but weaken the Israeli position when all is said and done, and both domestic and international pressures result in Israel calling it quits prior to reaching that incredibly difficult goal. And stating that Hassan Nasrallah and other leaders will be eliminated only matter if they actually take place. Better to remain quiet and take in the credit and praise only once something tangible is achieved.

While both Hezbollah and Israel have declared themselves disinterested in war at this time, in reality the next war will come too soon. When it does, Israel will do well to remember the lessons of 1967 and not just those of 2006.

Dr. Joshua Gleis is president of Gleis Security Consulting, author of “Withdrawing Under Fire: Lessons Learned from Islamist Insurgencies” and co-author of “Hezbollah and Hamas: A Comparative Case Study.”

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Infiltration from Gaza is our worst fear

More than the Code Red sirens, more than missiles and even more than terror tunnels—the scenario of terrorists infiltrating directly through the Gaza border fence is the event that residents of the Gaza vicinity are most concerned about.

 

On Tuesday it happened, and only miraculously ended without casualties. Finger-pointing and criticism aside, something about the sense of security cracked that day. While the sense of security in the communities surrounding the Gaza Strip is relatively good, it is also fragile.

The terrorists arrested (Photo: Barel Efraim)

In the everyday atmosphere there is a sense of security, even if disturbances on the border fence put a damper on the Passover holiday, and even if rockets are fired here and there. But when the paths near the settlements are freely treaded by three Palestinians armed with grenades and knives, anxiety rises. The nightmare scenario becomes reality.

It will take time, a long time, for this event to be forgotten—but we all know it will happen eventually, because it is human nature and that is the nature of the residents of the Gaza vicinity. Families will not leave because of the infiltration, and the number of children in the playgrounds in the surrounding communities will not decrease. The special relationship between the IDF and the residents will be maintained.

All this is true, but nevertheless the infiltration incident sharpened the frightening understanding that despite everything, if the terrorists really want to, then anything is possible. There is no such thing as one hundred percent protection. The border is not hermetic. Our fears are justified. It can happen. This is reality. Learn to live with it, because otherwise it is impossible to live at all.

Palestinians crossing the Gaza border fence

Currently, the barrier project is being built around the Gaza Strip, which is part of an underground obstacle against tunnels, and its upper part is a massive fence. The fence, which is identical to the fence that is currently located along the Israel-Egypt border, will be a significant obstacle and almost entirely prevent infiltrations such as Tuesday's, but there will always be a small hole through which it will be possible to penetrate Israeli territory. Residents of the Gaza vicinity do not delude themselves into thinking they can somehow be completely safe. Hamas or any other organization will continue its efforts to try to attack Israel in any way possible. The knowledge that the IDF is defending us makes a significant contribution to the sense of security, and the army has a very significant role in the growth of the settlements and in the decision of new residents to settle in the Gaza vicinity. An event like Tuesday's was expected, but should not have happened. The IDF also understands that this is a serious failure, as they have admitted Wednesday. But this failure is exactly the same as the small theoretical hole in the nearly, though not quite, perfect defense barrier for the Gaza vicinity communities. Ynet reporter Matan Tzuri lives in a community in the Gaza vicinity.

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If infiltrators reached Tze'elim, they could have reached Tel Aviv too

It’s reasonable to believe, with almost complete certainty, that the terrorists who infiltrated Israel from the Gaza Strip and were captured near the fence of the Tze’elim army base weren’t planning to carry out a terror attack. They likely wanted to be caught in possession of weapons, so that they would be apprehended and placed in an Israeli jail.

Regardless of their motive, however, the entire incident points to a serious border protection failure.

This isn’t a new practice. In recent years, in the wake of the growing humanitarian distress in Gaza, quite a few young Gazans were captured on Israeli territory in possession of weapons they didn’t even try to use. Later, they explained they wanted to be arrested so they could spend a few years in the Israeli jail, where they are entitled to three meals a day and are given the option of studying.

The terrorists apprehended in Tze’elim likely wanted to be imprisoned rather than carry out a terror attack (Photo: Barel Efraim)

Gazans who were apprehended on Israeli territory in the past said they had carried weapons with them so that they would be recognized as terrorists rather than as illegal aliens. Illegal aliens are usually returned to the strip or to the Palestinian Authority territories in the West Bank, while Palestinians caught with weapons are considered terrorists and are jailed.

The three men who infiltrated Israel on Monday night likely had a similar intention. They are members of one family from the southern strip. In the five hours they spent in Israel before being caught, they could have carried out not one—but a few terror attacks. Even when they were discovered, they showed no resistance indicating their plan had been to get arrested and imprisoned in Israel so they could enjoy the human living conditions they lack in Gaza.

(Photo: Barel Efraim)

Another possibility is that the three infiltrators were sent by Hamas to undermine the Gaza vicinity residents’ sense of security and humiliate the IDF soldiers guarding the border fence. In other words, Hamas or Islamic Jihad, or a different Palestinian organization, tried to carry out a "perceptual attack" which Israel would respond to in a relatively moderate manner, rather than a "kinetic attack"—a terror attack which physically targets people and is met with a much stronger Israeli military response, particularly at a time when Israel is determined to maintain its deterrence.

Regardless of the infiltrators' motive, the incident points to a serious failure in protecting the border and residents of the Western Negev. This kind of infiltration must never happen, as it puts not only the southern residents in real danger, but all residents of the State of Israel. A terrorist capable of reaching Tze'elim could reach Tel Aviv as well quite easily, within several hours. Three grenades and knife have the same deadly potential as a large explosive device. It's important, therefore, to investigate how this happened and what led to the failure.

The terrorists' clothes (Photo: Barel Efraim)

The Shin Bet and IDF are still interrogating the three terrorists, but we can already conclude that before infiltrating Israel, they had observed the border fence for quite a long time in the area northwest of Rafah. Eventually, they likely discovered a hole created by rainwater in the ground below the border fence or a place where the fence itself had been damaged by the weather. The small bolt cutters that were found in their possession are usually used by electricians and are capable of cutting a relatively thin barbed-wire fence. Only one cut wire was found in the breach they had crossed, but it was apparently created a big enough hole for an adult to pass through it.

Military forces near Tze'elim (Photo: Barel Efraim)

The army had receive a warning from the fence, and forces were dispatched to the area shortly before dawn, but the fighters failed to detect the infiltration either because the indication provided by the fence was far from the breach or because the breach was too small and they didn't see it. Another factor that made it difficult to spot the infiltrators was the heavy fog in the Gaza area that night. Terror organizations often focus their infiltration efforts on such foggy nights, when the IDF's observation and fence monitoring devices face difficulties detecting people approaching the fence until they are actually on it. The question that must be answered by the IDF is whether the fence was thoroughly checked by the force that was alerted to the fence after receiving the warning. Quite often, the fence transmits warnings as a result of a strong wind or animals touching the fence, and sometimes the terror organizations try to test the forces' alertness by throwing stones at the fence.

The terrorists’ grenades. In the five hours they spent in Israel before being caught, they could have carried out not one—but a few terror attacks (Photo: Police Spokesperson's Unit)

An obstacle aimed at blocking any infiltration attempt above and under the ground is being built on the Gaza border these days. Several kilometers of the defensive wall and fence have already been built. In the segments which have yet to be completed, Gazans can still infiltrate Israel pretty easily, although the system is capable of detecting such infiltrations relatively quickly and catching the infiltrators. Monday night's infiltration was detected more than three hours after it happened. But as soon as it was detected by an IDF tracker who spotted footprints, the forces were alerted and the terrorists were tracked down relatively fast—especially in light of the fact that they made no effort to hide their tracks. Had they concealed their tracks, as Palestinian terrorists usually do, they would have likely reached central Israel by then.

Construction work on a defensive wall around the Gaza Strip (Photo: EPA)

Only last weekend, a Palestinian cell infiltrated Israel and attempted to sabotage heavy engineering equipment used for the construction of the underground anti-tunnel barrier. When they heard tanks approaching them, they escaped and returned to the strip through a breach in the fence. That wasn't a random incident. Hamas is attempting to flex its muscles these days in a bid to enlist the Arab and international public opinion against Israel and help the organization overcome its isolation and the humanitarian crisis in the strip. The IDF is aware of that and should have increased its efforts to monitor the fence and prevent these kinds of infiltrations. While it's true any military measure—defensive or offensive—can be overcome if you put enough effort into it, the fact that the three Palestinians managed to enter Israel so easily indicates that the Gaza border fence isn't properly blocked. In light of the upcoming events, the IDF should draw some conclusions and look into different measures to deal with this problem. Restoring the Gaza vicinity resident's sense of confidence is as important as the actual security.

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Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza are bad news for both the Palestinians and Israel

When Fatah and Hamas signed a reconciliation agreement in Cairo about six months ago (one of many reconciliation agreements in the past decade), there was a lot of skepticism among many elements—Palestinian, Israeli, Arab and international—as to the chances of its success.

It was simple logic: Egypt managed to get the bitter rivals in one room, but demanded that they avoid discussing the biggest obstacle—handing the security control over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority and disarming the military wings.

So the organizations’ leaders sat around one table in Cairo and then in Gaza, shook hands, raised them in the air with a big smile, posed for photographs and promised that this time it’s for real, that this time it will work out. But the elephant in the room was big, too big.

In his distress, Abbas doesn’t mind using undiplomatic language (Photo: Reuters)

It took Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas only several days to declare from every stage that the Hezbollah model in Lebanon would not be duplicated in the Gaza Strip. Different Palestinian officials asserted in closed briefings that not a single worker in Hamas’ security apparatuses would be incorporated into the Palestinian security apparatuses.

Hamas, for its part, presented a very simple model: Anything above the ground would be under the Palestinian government’s responsibility, and anything underground would be under Hamas’ responsibility. Make no mistake—the word “underground” doesn’t refer to the tunnels alone, but to everything that has to do with the organization’s military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

Hamas and Fatah representatives sign the reconciliation agreement in Cairo in October 2017 (Photo: EPA)

From this point, it was already clear that a full reconciliation would not be reached, but the optimists believed there would be a partial reconciliation. Some referred to it as “a 30-percent reconciliation.”

But plans are one thing, and reality is another thing. Hamas did hand the control over the crossings to the PA, dismantle its front posts near the Erez and Karni crossings and give the PA control over the Rafah Crossing (which remained almost permanently closed), and the Palestinian government ministers in Ramallah did receive control over their ministries in Gaza, at least on paper—but that’s more or less where it ended.

Many believed that from this point, the reconciliation process would slowly die down, but then two explosions occurred: A physical explosion in the form of a roadside bomb that was detonated near Palestinian Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah’s convoy, and the second explosion in the form of Abbas’ verbal attack on Hamas at a Palestinian leadership meeting in Ramallah.

Not only has Abbas failed to lift most of the sanctions he imposed on the strip before the reconciliation agreement, but last week he even announced he would step up the measures against Gaza and Hamas. Further sanctions in the current unstable situation in the Gaza Strip will clearly deepen the crisis and the civilians’ distress. Ending the reconciliation agreement on a violent note is bad news for the Palestinians, but for Israel too.

Members of Hamas’ military wing (Photo: AP)

Why does it concern us? Past experience shows that when Hamas detects growing civilian unrest in Gaza which could lead to civil disobedience, it tends to divert the fire towards Israel. This could happen in the form of a new escalation or an attempt to surprise Israel with a significant attack or, alternatively, by giving thousands of Gazans the green light to march towards the Israeli border, thereby pushing the IDF into a corner in which any response would harm Israel. Such a march is already around the corner and is expected to take place sometime between Land Day and Nakba Day. Signs of escalation have begun both in Gaza and in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with different terror attacks carried out in recent weeks in both areas: Shooting, car-ramming and stabbing attacks in the West Bank and in Jerusalem, and improvised explosive devices planted on the Gaza border. As for indications that the reconciliation process is over, here’s a fresh example: Last week, the morning after Abbas’ fiery speech against Hamas, the organization’s security personnel arrived at a compound that used to serve as Hamas’ front post before the Erez crossing, for the first time since Hamas handed control of the crossing over to the PA. They got on a bus that was about to leave from the strip to the Allenby Crossing through Israel and checked every single passenger, before letting the bus hit the road.

Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar. Where has he disappeared to? (Photo: AP)

Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader in Gaza, had pushed for a reconciliation with Fatah more than anyone else in the organization. But following the dissolvement of the agreement in the past month, Sanwar has practically disappeared from the public stage. Last week, he was supposed to host the Palestinian factions in his office for a discussion on the state of the reconciliation process. The meeting was held in his office, but he didn’t show up. He was replaced by his deputy, Khalil al-Hayya. Does Sinwar’s disappearance have to do with the harsh disagreements with the Hamas leadership on how to deal with Fatah? That’s unclear at the moment, but these things are likely related.

Last week, Abbas also slammed US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman as a “son of a dog,” but that was a minor part of his speech, which was dedicated almost exclusively to attacking Hamas. The curse may have made headlines, but it doesn’t change the given situation between Ramallah and the current American administration since President Donald Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital—a complete rift which likely won’t be mended as long as the current administration is in power and as long as Abbas remains in his seat.

Abbas is in a state of distress and has no real support from the Arab countries or from the European Union. He feels lonely, he has a very short fuse, he is aging and his health isn’t getting any better. The Abbas doctrine has failed, and he has been unsuccessful in giving his people a state. For all these reasons, he doesn’t mind using less diplomatic language and speaking his mind. The ramifications of this curse as far as Israel is concerned, however, are insignificant compared to the ramifications we may be forced to deal with if Abbas’ sanctions on Gaza bring the strip to the brink of collapse. It is therefore more important to focus on the Gaza issue than on the “son of a dog” or “may your house come to ruin” curses.

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Why half of Israelis still support Netanyahu

The State of Israel is a special country, exceptional in almost every aspect. Our many achievements might soon be joined by another record: We could become the first democracy in the 21st century with the dubious honor of sending two prime ministers in a row to jail for corruption.

Ehud Olmert has already served out his sentence and has been released. Benjamin Netanyahu might also find himself, after a lot of wriggling and many delays, in the Maasiyahu Prison. Our wheels of justice turn very slowly when it comes to strong, brilliant and influential people, but at the end of the day, they usually grind exceedingly fine.

The words ‘rule of law’ simply don’t appeal to the majority of voters here, and Netanyahu understands that very well (Photo: MCT)

Why is this happening to us? Are we just a particularly corrupt country, which produces particularly corrupt politicians? I don’t think so. In most global corruption indices, we make it to the middle of the democratic countries list. And our situation is much better than countries like Turkey, Russia, Iran, all the Arab states, and almost all Third-World and Fourth-World countries. Granted, not everything is wonderful here, but we’re not Sodom and Gomorrah.

I think our problem, which is the reason many people in Israel’s political echelon are afflicted with corruption, is different: We are people with no borders.

We are literally borderless. Israel is the only country in the world which has been persistently refusing, for more than 50 years now, to outline its borders, even in its official maps. Remind me, where does Israel end? Along the Jordan River? Or possibly on the Green Line, may its memory be blessed? Or along the separation barrier in Judea and Samaria? It’s unclear, and not incidentally.

We don’t like to know, and we mainly don’t want to say, where we start and where we end. We don’t like that question. And we really don’t like borders. When Israelis see a border, they immediately start thinking about how to expand it and how to cross it. Ask the Egyptians, the Lebanese, the Syrians, the Palestinians and everyone whose bad luck got them involved in an armed conflict with us. It’s an experience I wouldn’t recommend to anyone.

New immigrants in 1949. Left the parental authority in their homelands (Photo: David Eldan, GPO)

Where does it come from, this thing with our borderlessness? I don’t know, but I have a hypothesis. The State of Israel was established by people who rebelled against their parents and went against the laws and rules of the societies they were born in. They came here to start over, their own way. Also the immigrants who arrived after the state’s establishment, from Islamic countries and from Europe, left the parental authority in their homelands. The new Sabra were ashamed of their parents’ ghetto mentality. Most importantly, they discounted them and they discounted their rules and borders. And so, Israel raised millions of people who are great at testing limits and love seeing what can be done without getting caught. In my opinion, there are two reasons why half of Israelis still support Netanyahu, although he has pink champagne on his hands: First, it’s unclear to us where a quid-pro-quo relationship between acquaintances and friends ends and where naked corruption begins. In a country where we are all brothers and buddies, where a friend brings a friend, it’s hard to know where exactly to draw the line between PR and lobbyist activity—which may stink but is nevertheless legal—and the criminal corruption in the meeting of government, capital and the press. Most of the people in Israel today hate the Supreme Court, and our quick politicians are finding it easy to incite against it and harass it. Why? In my opinion, it’s because the honorable court speaks a foreign language, rather than local Hebrew. The words “rule of law” simply don’t appeal to the majority of voters here, and Netanyahu understands that very well.

Which brings me to the second reason I believe Netanyahu will keep enjoying wide public support, even behind bars: Deep down inside, we want to be a bit like him. Many people here like to test the limits, to maneuver within the gray area between right and wrong, to stretch the possible to the limit and to successfully and quickly get away from those trying to catch them.

Winston Churchill, Netanyahu's hero, said: “Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.” From personal experience, I know he was right. In fact, we all do. Later this week, we’ll all sit around the Passover Seder table and sing: “Not only one has risen against us to annihilate us, but in every generation (our enemies) stand up against us to annihilate us.” We’ll sing, think and perhaps say out loud: “Isn’t it great that they tried and failed? We showed them, didn’t we?”

The Jewish and Israeli inclination to cross lines and find ways around restrictions is part of what makes the IDF such an efficient and dangerous army (Photo: Shutterstock)

There are undermining and rebellious elements both in Judaism and in the Jews. It’s a national trait, which has been following us like a shadow for 3,500 years now. Since Abraham got into an argument with God over the number of righteous people needed to save Sodom, we like to see what can be achieved through a combination of chutzpah, initiative, craftiness and a willingness to test the limits. The Jewish and Israeli inclination to cross lines and find ways around restrictions holds advantages too: Part of what makes the IDF such an efficient and dangerous army to its enemies is this spirit, which constitutes part of the education and socialization of all our commanders and fighters. Phrases like “pursuing contact,” “exploiting success” and “that’s what we have, and with that we’ll win” are not only clichés, but also a mentality which leads to resourcefulness, improvisation, thinking on one’s feet, and eventually victory. And it’s not only in the army. Chutzpah, initiative, thinking outside the box and a desire to test limits and do the impossible are part of the raw materials of many of the initiatives and inventions that have developed here, turning Israel into the startup nation we take so much pride in.

In conclusion, can we have it both ways? Can we be brave, cheeky entrepreneurs without being corrupt, hedonist criminals? I think so. In the 70 years of the State of Israel, we have had several prime ministers, from the Right and from the Left, who were a nice, personal example of such conduct.

I’m talking about David Ben-Gurion and Menachem Begin, about Levi Eshkol and Yitzhak Shamir. It’s not a pie in the sky, and it’s no dream. It will take time, but after the Netanyahu affair is over and behind us, we may succeed in doing what we’re so good at: Starting over.

Professor Yoram Yovell is a psychiatrist, brain researcher and psychoanalyst who teaches at the Hebrew University's School of Medicine and works at the Hadassah Ein Kerem Medical Center in Jerusalem. He can be reached at office@yovell.co.il.

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It’s time for an Israeli initiative concerning Gaza

Once again, we seem to be at the start of a period of security-related events both in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza. While the two areas are linked, primarily by Hamas—from a strategic perspective, these are two different stories that call for a different attitude.

The situation in Judea and Samaria is static and stable. As we are expecting no diplomatic breakthrough—unless US President Donald Trump suddenly surprises us—all we need to do is to pursue the current policy, which is based on economic and security cooperation. If there are any lessons to be learned from the recent events, they are essentially of a tactical nature.

In Gaza, things are different: There, an Israeli initiative is required. The situation is unstable and could deteriorate very soon, whether in the form of a military outburst like Operation Protective Edge or in a more complicated scenario of a mass protest aimed at breaking through the fence and marching towards Israel.

Israel-Gaza border. Gaza has been a de-facto independent state for 11 years now (Photo: AP)

The difference between the way we have gotten used to look at Gaza and the right way is based on three insights. First of all, Gaza has been a de-facto independent state for 11 years now. A state has four characteristics: A defined area; an efficient central government; an independent foreign policy; and an army of its own. Gaza meets all four requirements.

The second insight has to do with an examination of the interests. Israel has no political, economic or territorial interests concerning Gaza, but only a security interest to maintain calm. While Hamas’ vision is to destroy Israel, when it comes to its short-term interests it will settle for maintaining its control of Gaza. For that purpose, it needs international legitimization and urgent financial aid—which is why there is no real contradiction between the Israeli interests and Hamas’ immediate interests.

The third insight is that Gaza can’t be rebuilt as long as we insist that the money for the reconstruction is transferred directly to the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas isn’t interested in the strip’s reconstruction. He is interested in toppling the Hamas regime and has no compunction about doing so at the expense of the two million miserable people living there. He has no problem with another military conflict between Israel and Hamas either, as he sees it as a conflict between his two enemies.

The conclusion from these three insights is clear: Israel must change its policy and acknowledge the fact that it has an independent state named Gaza on its border, whose government was elected in a relatively democratic manner.

Israel is better off adopting a proper carrot and stick policy vis-à-vis Gaza than threatening it with sticks alone and hoping Egypt or Abbas will deal with the strip’s reconstruction (Photo: AP)

Furthermore, Israel should encourage Western and Arab states to invest in Gaza’s reconstruction, together with the Hamas government rather than behind its back. The more power stations, desalination facilities or sewage development projects are built in Gaza, the more it will restrain the Hamas government.

I am familiar with the claim that Hamas will use the aid to build more tunnels, but my claim is different: This has been happening in recent years because of the lack of negotiations with Hamas and because the money and the means aren’t being transferred directly to Hamas. If Hamas is recognized as a de-facto state, and if it signs agreements calling for strict supervision of the concrete and all other means sent into the strip, it will invest more in a civil infrastructure.

The political rift between the two parts of the Palestinian entity, the one in the West Bank and the one in Gaza, was created by the Palestinians—not by Israel. For that reason, Israel has no interest in turning the two areas into one state. We are better off adopting a proper carrot and stick policy vis-à-vis the independent state in Gaza than threatening it with sticks alone and hoping that Egypt or Abbas will deal with the strip’s reconstruction.

Major-General (res.) Giora Eiland is a former head of Israel's National Security Council.

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Some causes for concern following John Bolton appointment

Tehran woke up Friday morning to an unfavorable situation for the Iranians. The dismissal or resignation—it’s not entirely clear yet—of General H.R. McMaster from the position of US President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, and his replacement with former US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, points not only to the disorder in the top echelon of the American administration and in the White House, but mainly to a foreign and security policy that favors conflicts over settling disputes through diplomacy.

The national security adviser who was dismissed or stepped down on Thursday evening, a decorated general with extensive experience in the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, was against a US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran. Bolton, on the other hand, has publicly called on the administration several times to abandon what he defines as a bad agreement.

From left to right: Benjamin Netanyahu, Ali Khamenei and John Bolton (Photos: AP, AFP)

He isn’t the only one. The new secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, who replaced Rex Tillerson several weeks ago, is a diplomatic and security hawk who has also called for a cancellation of the nuclear agreement with Iran and for a conflict with North Korea. Pompeo, who came to the State Department from the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States, was replaced by Gina Haspel, who shares his thoughts and is possibly even more radical than he is.

The current makeup of the Trump administration doesn’t bode well not only for Iran but also for North Korea and China, and likely for Russian President Vladimir Putin, Syrian President Bashar Assad and leaders of the European Union countries as well.

The Iranians are facing a clear dilemma now. They will have to agree to restrain their ballistic missile program and make amendments to their nuclear agreement with the world powers—or suffer harsh economic sanctions, which will badly affect the Iranian economy. On the other hand, they may decide to stop playing by the rules and move forward towards a nuclear bomb, risking an American airstrike on their nuclear facilities and missile.

Iranian missile test in 2016. Will Iran reconsider its ballistic missile program? (Photo: EPA)

These are basically the two strategic alternatives that will be have to be considered now by Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei and the ayatollahs. The Europeans will also have to double their efforts from now on and convince Iran to accept the compromise they are working on with the US, in a bid to prevent Trump from walking away from the nuclear agreement. The Iranians will likely become more attentive to Europe's leaders, after they realize that the alternative could be a military conflict with the US.

Another equally important strategic issue which will likely be reexamined in light of the changes in the US administration’s foreign and security policy is the planned meeting between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

The new national security adviser, who served as ambassador to the UN under President George W. Bush, argued recently that the meeting with the North Korean leader was a “waste of time,” based on the experience of previous US administration that had reached agreements with Pyongyang and then saw them violated. A cancellation of the meeting, which is scheduled to take place in late May, could create a new explosive situation in East Asia, in the Korean Peninsula and in Japan. But that’s not all. The Trump administration recently announced new sanctions on Russia. Bolton and Pompeo will likely demand an even more hawkish policy. The Chinese president should be as concerned as Putin. The recent US announcement on tariffs on steel and other products imported from China is essentially a first step towards a trade war with China under the “America First” slogan.

Assad with his fighters in Ghouta. A real cause for concern

Assad, who is using chemical weapons against his own citizens, has a real cause for concern too. Rex Tillerson was a moderating factor in the American administration. Secretary of Defense James Mattis represents a level-headed approach too, not now he is a minority in the administration, and if Assad uses chemical weapons once again, he should take a harsh American response into account. In fact, Assad has already started preparing for such an option in after being told by the Russians that the Americans could attack him at any given moment.

Jerusalem allegedly has a cause for celebration. Bolton, the new national security adviser, is a clear friend of Israel. So is US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley and new Secretary of State Pompeo. They are all in favor of moving the embassy to Jerusalem and they all support Trump’s oppositional approach towards America’s enemies in the international arena and towards its economic competitors.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can be satisfied, therefore, as his approach towards the nuclear agreement with Iran seems to be supported now not only by the president but by the entire American security-diplomatic echelon, perhaps excluding Secretary of Defense Mattis, who listens to the what the Pentagon generals tell him. My advice to IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot, however, is to check the war reserve stores, so we don’t accidentally find ourselves involved in a war we didn’t initiate as a result of the unpredictable, zigzagging conduct of the US president and his senior administration officials. Netanyahu can be satisfied with other issues as well, like the approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the current state of affairs, Trump likely won’t rush to present his plan for peace in the Middle East. There is a good chance that he will shelve it for a long time, perhaps even a year.

Trump (R) and Pompeo (Photo: MCT, Reuters)

But the current Israeli government and Israel’s citizens should have a cause for concern, not so much because of President’s Trump conflict-seeking policy and his walk on the edge when it comes to international and strategic issues, but because of the disorder in the White House. In his 14 months in office, Trump has replaced three national security advisers. This is something that has never happened in US history. The national security adviser in the American administration is as important and sometimes even more important than the secretary of state, and is almost equal in status to the secretary of defense. He is the man who whispers in the president’s ear and briefs him every morning. He is the man the president trusts. The replacement of three national security advisers indicates, therefore, that Trump is incapable of taking advise and, most importantly, that he has no self-discipline and no willingness to accept organized strategic planning that presents him with all the options from which he must pick out one. He has zero attention span and works according to intuition rather than according to strategic planning and discretion. Another problem is that there is no one in the administration now to present an opinion that contradicts the president’s opinion. Contradicting opinions are important, as they force all sides to reconsider and reach optimal decisions. In Israel, we experienced a similar situation in the Second Lebanon War, when a prime minister who had just taken office, and had appointed a defense minister and chief of staff with little experience, entered a war without realizing he was entering a war. He and his cabinet were convinced that they were initiating a limited battle, and we all know what happened next. The same thing could happen with Trump, but at a much larger scale and with major ramifications. If we’re already making comparisons, I should say that while the Second Lebanon War was managed terribly, we have been enjoying a relative calm in the north for the past 11 years thanks to the Israel Air Force. President Trump’s unreasonable conduct and the chaos in his administration could have positive results too. The Iranians may, for example, reach the conclusion that they shouldn’t get involved in a conflict with an unpredictable American president at this time. But that’s a gamble, and no one wants matters of war and peace, of life and death, to be in the hands of a man who is an obsessive tweeter and who declares war and then changes his mind, and so on and so forth. We must remember that America’s international standing has a direct effect on the State of Israel’s security. The US is our patron. That doesn’t mean we’re incapable of defending ourselves, but America’s strength is an important component in Israel’s deterrence against its enemies, primarily Iran. If the US is perceived in the world as an unreliable country that can’t be trusted, Israel suffers too.

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